We analyze the result of allowing risk averse traders to split their orders among markets when market makers are assumed to be risk averse.
Introduction
A large body of papers analyze the formation and properties of price and liquidity in …nancial markets.
1 In order to study both, three assumptions are commonly made. First, market makers behave competitively. Second, traders cannot split their orders among market makers.
2 Third, market makers are risk neutral. As a result of the …rst and second assumptions, risk neutral market makers set a price equal to the expected value of the asset given market maker's information and aggregate order ‡ow. This implies that market makers earn zero expected pro…t. Both the second and the third assumptions are more simplifying assumptions than realistic ones. Indeed, traders have now a wide range of possibilities to trade a given asset. In addition, Lyons (1995) proves that, in FX markets, dealers closely control their inventory position showing the fact they are risk averse. It is likely to be also true for equity and bond markets.
In the present model we remove the three aforementioned assumptions. This enables us to combine the assumptions of imperfect competition and risk aversion for both the market makers and the traders. We then analyze the e¤ects of these assumptions on prices, liquidity and the level of expected pro…t market makers achieve in a situation where traders split their orders among market makers.
In the recent years, the number of markets where traders have the possibility to trade a given asset has increased, due to the emergence of "New Markets"as well as the introduction of "Crossing Network" within existing dealer markets. Parallely, after the recent crashes, market participants'attitude toward risk has changed, this has implied an increase in both market participants'risk aversion as well as market volatility. As a consequence, some natural questions arise: How is the cost of trading a¤ected by the level of the market makers' risk aversion?
3 How is that same cost in ‡uenced by the number of market makers with whom the traders can exchange? How is the overall liquidity of an asset a¤ected by both the number of market makers and their risk aversion? How is the degree of competition between market makers in ‡uenced by the number of traders competing for the exchange of an asset? How is the trading behavior of risk averse traders a¤ected by the possibility to trade the same asset on di¤erent markets or with multiple dealers? These questions need to be answered in order to shed some light on the facts observed in …nancial markets such as, wider bid-ask spreads (high transaction costs), for instance.
We propose to answer these questions in a setting close to Kyle (1985) . The price schedule of a market maker is contingent to the aggregate order ‡ow for that particular market maker only and not contingent to the order ‡ow received by the other market makers. Each market maker determines the price maxi-1 Liquidity is de…ned as the volume necessary to move the price by one unit. See Kyle (1985) .
2 See Kyle (1984) , Kyle (1985) , Subrahmanyam (1991) , Foster and Viswanathan (1994) and Vives (1995) among others.
3 Lyons (2001) raises the fact that too few models study the situation where market makers are risk averse.
mizing her expected utility taking as given the price set by her competitors and taking into account its impact on the market orders submitted by the traders. 4 Prior to knowing the price schedule, traders receive (i) di¤erent signals concerning the fundamental value of the asset and (ii) di¤erent endowments of the risky asset. When deciding the size of their orders for each market maker, traders know the di¤erent market makers'price schedule. Each trader determines the size of each order submitted to the di¤erent markets by maximizing his conditional expected utility taking into account the impact of his orders on the price for each market and taking as given the quantity submitted by the other traders. We …nd a counterintuitive result that increasing the number of market makers, N , with whom traders exchange, can adversely a¤ect the traders'overall cost of trading and this despite the fact that the aggregate liquidity increases with N . The interpretation of this result is as follows. Firstly, increasing N has the following e¤ects: (i) it increases the aggregate risk tolerance of the market makers and increases risk sharing, (ii) it reduces the individual liquidity in each market, and …nally (iii) it reduces the volume handled by market makers. The …rst and the second e¤ect clearly increase aggregate expected utility of pro…t. However, the reduction in volume has two opposite e¤ects on aggregate expected utility of pro…t. Secondly, increasing m has the following implications: (i) it decreases the aggregate risk tolerance of the market makers, (ii) it reduces the individual liquidity in each market, and …nally (iii) it reduces the volume received by market makers. E¤ect (i) decreases aggregate expected utility of pro…t whereas e¤ect (ii) increases it. The reduction in volume has again two opposite e¤ects. In fact we show that when m > 0, the positive e¤ects (those which increase the aggregate expected utility of pro…t) dominate for a small number of market makers while the negative e¤ect dominates for a large number of market makers. As a result risk aversion can magnify the transaction costs paid by investors. To the best of our knowledge this is the …rst time this result has been found, as our model looks at the most general situation where both traders and market makers are strategic and risk averse. This …nding has important implications for the regulation of …nancial markets.
Our result can be regarded as an answer to the ongoing debate about the implications of market fragmentation on traders'welfare. We …nd that increasing market fragmentation seen as increasing the number of market makers can damage the traders' welfare. Having more market makers or markets is not always desirable from the point of view of investors'trading costs. Other results include that, for a …nite number of market makers, the level of aggregate liquidity is below its competitive level implying that market makers earn positive expected pro…ts. 5 The explanation of that result is as follows: by increasing her price, a market maker reduces the volume received without modifying the proportion of the trader's market order due to hedging needs. 6 4 In our context as the price is a linear function with the aggregate order ‡ow it is equivalent to …nd the level of liquidity maximizing her expected utility. 5 The competitive level is computed in a situation where traders cannot split their orders and market makers face competition.
6 Due the traders'CARA utility framework, an increase in price only alters the size of the However, the increase in price may still compensate for the e¤ect of the decrease in volume on the market maker's expected utility of pro…t. In fact, despite a higher price, the trader is willing to exchange on that market, as by splitting his order he reduces its overall impact on the price. This implies that all market makers have an incentive, due to their risk aversion, to set less competitive price schedules. Nevertheless, when the number of market makers tend to in…nity, both the market makers' expected utility of pro…t and the aggregate liquidity tend to their competitive level. Our work is linked to research focusing on dealers'competition. There are a strong evidences that dealers behave strategically and earn monopoly rents. Christie and Schultz (1994) and Christie et al. (1994) show that market makers on the NASDAQ may exhibit a non-competitive behavior. This is also con…rmed by latest studies such as Weston (2000) and Simaan, Weaver and Whitcomb (2003) . Lamoureux and Schnitzlein (2004) …nd, in an experimental study, similar results. They compare the size of the bid-ask spread and of the dealers' pro…t for two scenario: (i) three competing dealers in a single asset (i.e. direct competition) and (ii) three assets with a monopolistic dealer in each (indirect competition). They …nd that bid-ask spreads are wider and that per-trade dealer pro…ts are larger for the …rst scenario. Theoretical papers have looked at the e¤ect of the competition among market makers on their expected pro…ts and their price schedule.
8 Glosten (1994) and Biais, Martimort and Rochet (2000) study competition in limit orders. Biais, Martimort and Rochet (2000) …nd that when the number of market makers is …nite, market makers earn positive expected pro…ts. They also show that as the number of market makers tends to in…nity, market makers earn zero expected pro…ts and the price schedule converges to the competitive one obtained in Glosten (1994) . Biais et al. (1998) and Viswanathan and Wang (2002) consider risk averse market makers. The former compares the cost of trading across markets organized di¤erently, i.e. ‡oors, dealer markets and limit orders. The latter looks at dealership markets, limit order markets and a hybrid market mixing the two preceding structures. They do not provide an analysis of the model we study here. In addition, they look at the case where a unique liquidity trader is present in the market. Vogler (1997) and Lyons (1997) look at risk averse market makers, however, their main focus is on an inter-dealer markets. Finally, Bernhardt and Hughson (1997) are closer to our analysis. They study the competition between market makers for the duopoly case. Their setting is similar to Kyle (1985) with market makers setting price schedules as a function of the aggregate order ‡ow before traders submit their orders. They show that in equilibrium market makers cannot earn zero expected pro…ts. For the duopoly case, the existence and the form of the equilibrium is shown. However, for the market order without changing the proportion of hedging motives within the order. 7 An important di¤erence between the two scenarios lies in the fact that in the three asset case, liquidity traders as well as having the possibility to time their trade have the choice of which asset to trade. This is the main driving force for their result.
8 Less recent papers [Admati and P ‡eiderer (1988) and Glosten (1989) ] focus on the extreme case where the market maker or specialist has a monopolistic position over a particular asset. oligopolistic case they show that an equilibrium cannot be such that market makers earn zero expected pro…t but do not prove its existence. We depart from their analysis on two important points. First, we consider the case of risk averse market makers. Second, heterogeneously informed traders also possessing heterogenous endowments of the risky asset compete between each other.
The contribution of our paper is twofold. Firstly, on a purely theoretical basis, we generalize Bernhardt et al. (1997) and Biais, Martimort and Rochet (2000) to the cases where there are N > 2 risk averse market makers and more than 1 trader. To the best of our knowledge, the dealers'risk aversion has not been incorporated in any analysis for the type of model we are dealing with, i.e. models with asymmetry of information with splitting orders, an exception being Subrahmanyam (1991) and Spiegel and Subrahmanyam (1992) for the case where traders cannot split their orders. Secondly, we o¤er a potential answer to the ongoing debate concerning the dealers' competitiveness. Indeed, risk aversion reduces competition between market makers as it acts as a commitment for market makers to set higher prices. This commitment is higher the higher the risk aversion.
An outline of the paper is as follows. In Section 2, we present the general model allowing traders to split their orders. In Section 3, we solve the model for the linear symmetric equilibrium. We look at the properties of the liquidity and the market makers' aggregate expected pro…t in section 4. Section 5 presents our conclusions and summarizes our results. Finally all proofs and some of the graphs are gathered in the Appendix.
The model
Consider a market where a risky asset and a riskless asset are traded among K traders and N market makers. For convenience, the riskless asset has its interest rate normalized to zero. The liquidation value of the risky asset, e v, is normally distributed with mean 0 and variance
All agents, i.e. traders and market makers, are risk averse and have preferences described by a CARA utility function of the following form
where and m represent the parameter of risk aversion and W k and W n represent the …nal wealth.
Before trading all traders receive heterogenous signals about the future value of the risky asset and heterogenous endowments of both the risky and the riskless assets. Each trader k's signal, s k , is a realization of a normally distributed random variables k =ṽ +" k where" k is normally distributed with mean 0 and variance 2 " (precision " ). Trader k's endowment of the risky asset, w k , is a realization of a normally distributed random variable,w k with zero mean and variance 2 w . If w k is positive (negative), the trader holds a long (short) position in the risky asset. Trader k's endowment of the riskless asset is denoted by c k . The traders exchange for two reasons: hedging motives and informational reasons. Indeed, on the one hand, they trade for pure risk-sharing reasons as they receive an endowment shock to the risky asset. On the other hand, as they receive private information they will exploit their informational advantage by trading on that private information, they are then informed speculators. In the present model, we do not require noise traders as part of the orders submitted to the market makers are due to risk sharing motives.
All random variables e v," k ,w j for k = 1; :::; K and j = 1; :::; K are independent.
The timing unfolds as follows:
1. Each trader k = 1; :::; K, simultaneously observes his private signal s k as well as his endowments, w k and c k for the risky and the riskless asset, respectively;
2. Each market maker n = 1; :::; N , simultaneously, posts a price schedule depending, solely, on her own order ‡ow. The price schedule is not contingent on the order ‡ow received by the other market makers as it is not observed;
3. Given the market makers' price schedules, each trader, simultaneously, determines how much to trade with each market maker;
4. Each market maker observes her own aggregate order ‡ow and then clears it at the price previously posted;
5. The value of the asset is revealed and payo¤s are realized.
It is assumed that traders submit market orders.
Characterization of the equilibrium
As in Kyle (1985) , the model is solved for linear symmetric equilibria. We assume that the market order submitted by trader k to market maker n, is linear in both the signal and the endowment of the risky asset, i.e.,
x nk = a n s k b n w k , 8n = 1; :::; N and 8k = 1; :::; K.
(
The price schedule set by market maker n is linear in the anticipated aggregate order ‡ow, y n , in her own market, p n = n y n , 8n = 1; :::; N with
De…nition (Equilibrium) ( 1 ; :::; N ) 2 < N and (X 1 ; ::
with X k = (X 1k ; :::; X nk ; :::; X N k ) is an equilibrium if, given the market orders submitted by the other traders and the liquidity set by each market maker, the market orders submitted by trader k, X k , to the di¤ erent market makers are such that
and given every market orders submitted to market maker n and the liquidity set by the other market makers, the liquidity set by market maker n, n , is such that
Each trader determines the size of each order, x nk , submitted to the di¤erent markets by maximizing his conditional expected utility taking into account the impact of his orders on the price for each market and taking as given the quantity submitted by the other traders. Each market maker determines the level of liquidity maximizing her expected utility taking as given the liquidity set by her competitors and taking into account its impact on the market orders submitted by the traders.
Given the linearity assumption of the price schedule, computing the price level maximizing the market maker's expected pro…t is equivalent to computing the liquidity parameter, , maximizing the expected pro…t. This is used in order to write the above de…nition.
The model is solved by backward induction: we …rst solve the traders'program and then we solve the market makers'program.
We dedicate the next proposition to the resolution of the trader's maximization program.
Proposition 1 There exists a unique solution to the trader's maximization program. The quantity submitted to market n, with n = 1; :::; N , is the positive root of the following third degree equation
with a n = " b n :
The quantity submitted to any other market, j 6 = n, is such that n a n = j a j .
Proof: See Appendix.
The trader splits his market order across the di¤erent markets in such a way that the marginal cost of trading across markets is equalized. Suppose that a particular market is less liquid than the other markets. The trader still submits an order to that market, as by splitting the order the trader reduces the overall impact of his order on prices. However, because the price impact of the order in that particular market is higher, the trader will reduce the size of the order in such a way that the marginal cost of trading is the same across markets.
The next proposition states the existence of the equilibrium.
The price set by each market maker n = 1; :::; N is p n = (N ) y n , 8n = 1; :::; N;
each trader i = 1; :::; K submits to the di¤ erent market makers a market order of the following form
where a (N ) and n (N ) are de…ned in the Appendix.
Proof. See Appendix.
The model studied here is very general. A drawback of such a general model is that closed form solutions cannot be found. However, the proposition is proved using numerical procedures.
The su¢ cient condition for the existence of the equilibrium can be interpreted as follows. It states that the hedging motives must outweigh the informational motives for the existence of a linear equilibrium price schedule. Indeed the hedging motives must be large enough to induce, with a linear price schedule, a non-negative expected pro…t for the market makers.
9
The trader's risk aversion as well as the precision of the private information a¤ect both the size of the market order and its composition. Intuitively, by keeping constant the size of the market order, an increase in the trader's risk aversion has a direct e¤ect of increasing the proportion of the market order due to hedging motives whereas an increase of the precision " increases the proportion of the market order due to private information. All other parameters a¤ect the size of the order, without changing its composition.
We look at some of the important properties of both the liquidity and the expected pro…t of the market makers.
Properties of the Equilibrium

Liquidity
We look at some of the properties of both the individual liquidity, or market depth, i.e. the liquidity set by each market maker, and aggregate liquidity de…ned as being the sum of all liquidities. In our case, aggregate liquidity is
Proposition 3 (Liquidity) Individual liquidity is a non-monotonic function (…rst increasing and then decreasing) of the number of market makers (N ) whereas aggregate liquidity increases with N .
The proposition is proved using numerical procedures. Individual liquidity …rstly increases with N and then decreases with it. As stated in Proposition 1, the trader splits his order across markets in such a way that the marginal trading cost is equalized across markets. As a consequence, the trader submits a smaller quantity to markets with lower liquidity. By setting a higher price, the market maker does not modify the ratio of hedging to informed trading received. Indeed the trader reduces the size of his order without altering its composition.
10 Hence, by increasing her price, a market maker reduces the volume received, however, the increase in price may still compensate for the decrease in volume implying higher expected payo¤. This gives the intuition for the slope of the individual price schedule. However, we …nd that the aggregate price schedule faced the traders as a smaller slope leading to a more competitive aggregate price schedule. This result is also found in Bernhardt and Hughson (1997) . Figure 1 shows the individual liquidity for di¤erent values of the market makers' risk aversion as well as for di¤erent number of market makers. For an initial low number of market makers, the increase in individual liquidity is sharper for risk neutral than for risk averse market makers. In addition, as the risk aversion increases, the impact of increasing the number of market makers decreases. The decrease in individual liquidity for a large number of market makers is true for risk neutral as well as for risk averse market makers.
The following simulations (Figure 2) show the levels of aggregate liquidity for risk neutral as well as for risk averse market makers.
From the …gures obtained, aggregate liquidity increases with the number of market makers and converges to the competitive level.
11 The e¤ective price schedule faced by the traders decreases due to more competition. It is also the case, that the aggregate liquidity decreases with the market makers'risk aversion. This comparative static is very intuitive. Indeed, as the market maker's risk aversion increases, the cost of handling a given size of the order ‡ow increases. The market maker then requires more compensation which decreases liquidity. However, as can be seen, increasing the market makers' risk aversion reduces the positive impact of competition on the aggregate liquidity level. This can be understood as follows. Risk aversion acts as a commitment device for market makers to set high prices. As their risk aversion increases, their commitment is even stronger reducing the positive impact of competition.
Our model displays some properties consistent with BMR and BH regarding aggregate liquidity and volume traded. They both increase with the number of market makers. It should be pointed out that in BMR the measure of liquidity is the Bid-Ask spread, they show that it decreases with the number of market makers.
Aggregate Expected Utility of Pro…t
We now look at the properties concerning the market makers' aggregate expected utility of pro…t.
Proposition 4 (Market Makers'Aggregate Expected Utility of Pro…t)
In equilibrium, the market makers' aggregate expected utility of pro…t decreases with both m , and N .
The proposition is proved using numerical procedures. Figure 3 shows the relationship between the aggregate expected utility of pro…t and N , the number of market makers, m , and the number of traders present in the auction.
The market makers' aggregate expected utility of pro…t always decreases with the number of market makers and tends to zero when the number of market makers is in…nite.
12 This clearly results from competition. The reduction in the expected utility of pro…t due to an increase in the market makers'risk aversion
We now turn to the aggregate expected utility of pro…t for the traders. This provides us with a measure of the overall and true cost of trading for the investors as a group.
Proposition 4 (Traders' Aggregate Expected Utility of Pro…t) In equilibrium, the traders' aggregate expected utility of pro…t decreases with N , and is a non-monotonic function of m and .
The proposition is proved using numerical procedures. In order to understand these results we have to understand all the basic e¤ects on the market makers' aggregate expected utility of pro…t of varying N and m . Firstly, increasing N has the following e¤ects: (i) it increases the aggregate risk tolerance of the market makers and increases risk sharing, (ii) it reduces the individual liquidity in each market, and …nally (iii) it reduces the volume handled by market makers. The …rst and the second e¤ect clearly increase aggregate expected utility of pro…t. However, the reduction in volume has two opposite e¤ects on aggregate expected utility of pro…t. Indeed, the reduction in volume has an obvious e¤ect of reducing them but at the same time it reduces the uncertainty faced by market makers increasing them. Secondly, increasing m has the following implications: (i) it decreases the aggregate risk tolerance of the market makers, (ii) it reduces the individual liquidity in each market, and …nally (iii) it reduces the volume received by market makers. E¤ect (i) decreases aggregate expected utility of pro…t whereas e¤ect (ii) increases it. The reduction in volume has again two opposite e¤ects described earlier.
Obviously, the magnitude of all these e¤ects is also in ‡uenced by the number of traders present in the auction.
The following …gures (4; 5) show the traders' aggregate expected utility of pro…t as a function of both the number of market makers and their risk aversion for di¤erent level of traders'risk aversion.
Increasing the number of market makers adversely a¤ects the cost of trading. Paradoxically, from the point of view of the traders it is not desirable to increase the number of market makers providing liquidity in the market.
The above result implies that the widely used measure of traders' welfare, i.e. market depth or liquidity, is an inappropriate measure. Indeed, the traders' cost of trading increases with the number of market makers despite the fact that aggregate liquidity increases.
In BMR, the mark-ups above the competitive or e¢ cient price schedule are shown to decrease with the number of market markers. As market makers are risk neutral this results in a decrease of their expected pro…t when their number increases. Their result is identical to BH.
Conclusion
This paper looks at the case where traders can split their orders among di¤erent market makers. Our model combines the assumptions of imperfect competition and risk aversion from the perspective of both market makers and traders. This study is conducted for a …nancial market organized as a batch auction. Each market maker commits to a level of liquidity and to a price form, in our case the price is a linear function of the order ‡ow. At that price, each market maker clears the market, i.e., takes a position that balances supply and demand. The risk averse traders receive both heterogenous private information of the liquidation value of the traded risky asset and heterogenous endowment of the same asset. As a consequence, the traders trade for informational as well as hedging motives.
The main …ndings of the paper are the following. We prove the existence of a linear symmetric equilibrium. We obtain that aggregate liquidity increases with the number of market makers. For a …nite number of market makers, they earn positive expected utility of pro…t. We show that the market makers' aggregate expected utility of pro…t decreases with the number of market makers. We also show that the traders' aggregate expected utility of pro…t decreases with the number of market makers. This implies that the investors' cost of trading increases with the number of market makers. As a result the traders' welfare is adversely a¤ected by increasing the number of market makers. A direct implication of that …nding is that market liquidity or market depth is an inappropriate measure of investors' trading costs. As in various other papers, it is also shown that market makers' aggregate expected pro…t tends to zero whenever the number of market makers is in…nite.
Empirical papers such as Christie and Schultz (1994) , Christie et al. (1994) , Weston (2000) and Simaan et al. (2003) …nd that market makers on the NAS-DAQ exhibit a non-competitive behavior. Our paper brings a new perspective to this non-competitive behavior. We …nd that their non-competitive behavior is exacerbated by their risk aversion. The more risk averse the market makers, the more market makers it takes for the aggregate liquidity to converge to its competitive level. In other words, risk aversion decreases the bene…ts of competition on the level of aggregate liquidity.
Our results could be regarded as an answer to the ongoing debate about the implications of market fragmentation on traders'welfare. We …nd that increasing market fragmentation, seen as increasing the number of market makers, can damage traders'welfare. Having more market makers or markets is not desirable from the point of view of investors'trading costs. 
Appendix
Proofs Proof of Proposition 1:
Given the di¤erent prices set by each market maker n = 1; :::; N , p n = n y n , each investor, k = 1; :::; K, submits a quantity x nk = a n s k b n w k to each market. That quantity maximizes the expected pro…t for trader k taking into account its e¤ect on the price, 
Di¤erentiating the above expression with respect to x nk , we get 8n = 1; :::N
(1 n a n (K 1))
The entire system of …rst order conditions is given by
with
We …rst prove that the above system admits a unique solution as a maximum using a sequence of steps.
In step 1, we prove a useful property of the above system, i.e. trader k chooses his quantity such that the marginal cost of trading is equal across markets. In step 2, we prove that D N can be inverted, i.e. its determinant is di¤erent from zero. In step 3, we prove the existence and unicity of a positive solution. In step 4, we show that the solution is indeed a maximum.
Step 1:
Lemma 1 8 (n; j) 2 [1; N ] [1; N ] and n 6 = j, we have that n a n = j a j and n b n = j b j .
Proof. Using the expressions of the market orders as well as
, the above system (4) can be rewritten as
(5) Looking at the jth line of the above system and identifying the multiplicative parameters for s k and w k respectively, we get
Factorizing all terms with j a j and j b j for both equations we have
Solving the system (6) for j a j and j b j , we get
In order to prove that j a j is indeed equal to a constant, we still have to prove that its multiplicative term is di¤erent from zero. We prove it by contradiction.
Suppose that 9 (j; n) 2 [1; N ] [1; N ] with j 6 = n such that j a j 6 = n a n . Equation (7) is also true for n = 1; :::; N . We then get 8 (j; n) 2 [1; N ] [1; N ] with n 6 = j j a j G = F; n a n G = F:
and F = A A 0 z(ai) z(bi) . This implies that G = 0 leading to F = 0. We now prove that there is a contradiction. We can rewrite G as
If G = 0, this would imply that
Factorizing the term 1 z(bi)+2 , we can rewrite the above expression as
We now look at the sign of the last term z (b i )
Using the de…nition of z (:), this can be expressed as
Using some algebra, we can write the above expression as follows
which is equal to
The expression between brackets can be split into two terms: the terms such that i < j and the terms such that i > j. Again using some basic algebra we can show that
Using the latter and proceeding of a change of variable whereby j 0 = i and i 0 = j, we obtain
which after some computations can be written as
As F is a sum of positive terms, F is di¤erent from zero. That leads to a contradiction. As a conclusion we have that 8 (n; j) 2 [1; N ] [1; N ] and n 6 = j, n a n = j a j . Moreover this also implies that 8 (n; j) 2 [1; N ] [1; N ] and n 6 = j, n b n = j b j .
Step 2: We now prove that D N can be inverted.
Given step 1, D N can be written as follows
Proof. The proof is done by iteration. For N = 1 and N = 2, the determinants are given by
It is straightforward to show that both determinants verify the form set in the lemma. We now show that the form is also true for N , assuming that it is true for N 2 and N 1. We rewrite D N as
where the last column of D N was replaced by the last column minus the N 1th column. The same change was performed for the last row. The determinant by developing from the last line and then from the last column gives
Using the form of det D N 1 and det D N 2 , and reorganizing the resulting expression we get
After some algebra on both the …rst and the second term in brackets respectively, we can rewrite them as follows
Using the latter expressions, the determinant of D N is equal to
which is the form we were looking for. Moreover the determinant is strictly positive as the 's are positive. We can then conclude that the matrix can be inverted.
Step 3: Existence and Unicity. Given step 1 and step 2, it is straightforward to show that a n = " b n for n = 1; :::; N .
Moreover given step 1, step 2 and the above, the …rst order condition (3) can be written as
Given step 1, A k is independent of n and is therefore a constant. In the expression de…ning A k , we replace all x ik 8i = 1; :::; N by
and all b n by a n " and put in factor the term A k and simplify
The term multiplied by A k , henceforth called H, can be simpli…ed as follows.
We multiply that term by
i as the following simpli…cation can be done
The …rst equality sign is due to step 1, the rest is just some basic algebra. The same can be done for the term
, we then get that it is equal to
Using the above, we can rewrite
It is straightforward to see that H is positive. Using all the simpli…cations, equation (8) leads to
Given the expression of x nk , by identi…cation we have
This expression can be written as a third degree polynomial of the following form
The last term being negative and t being positive, the third degree equation admits at least one positive solution. The existence of a solution is then guaranteed.
The proof of the unicity follows Subrahmanyam (1991) . Let us de…ne the following functions f (a n ) = a n ; g (a n ) = g1(an) g2(an) ;
with g 1 (a n ) = (1 n a n (K 1)) "
Let us point out that g 2 (a n ) is positive when a n > 0. We show the unicity of the solution by proving that the derivative of g (:) is strictly smaller than 1 (derivative of f (:)) at points such that f (a n ) = g (a n ). After some algebra, we have that
The 2nd degree polynomial h reaches its maximum at a n = 1 2 n K 1+ 2 " + 2
at this point the value of the function
As g 2 (a n ) >
i , we get that 8a n 2 < + , g 0 (a n ) < 1. The unicity of a positive solution is then proved.
Step 4: In order to prove that the solution is a maximum we prove that D n is negative semide…nite. That matrix is given by
It can be seen that det (
From the Lemma proved in step 2, we know that det D N > 0, which implies for uneven N that det ( D N ) < 0, whereas for even N det ( D N ) > 0. This proves that the matrix D N is negative semide…nite which in turn proves that the solution is a maximum.
The two following Lemmas give the expression of the expected utility of pro…t for market maker n and the expression of the expected utility for trader n respectively. These expressions are used in the numerical procedures.
Lemma 3 Given the linearity of both the market orders and the price schedule, given by (1) and (2) respectively, the expected utility of pro…t for market maker n is given by
Proof: In the price schedule (2) replace x nk by its expression given in (1) and after some rearranging, the price schedule can be written as p n = n y n = n a n Kṽ + n a n
Replace the above expression into the market maker's expected utility, we get n = E ṽ ( n a n K 1) + n a n
Developing and using the fact that all random variables are independent and have zero mean leads to n = Ka n ( n a n K 1)
We need to compute all individual variances, using some basic statistics techniques, we have
Replace all the individual variances into the expression of the expected utility of pro…t (10), use the fact that a n = " b n after some simpli…cations the desired result is obtained.
Lemma 4 Given the linearity of both the market orders and the price schedule, given by (1) and (2) respectively, and given proposition 1, the expected utility of trader k is given by
Proof: Trader k's expected utility is such that
Using the expression of p n = n P K j=1 x nj and the linearity of the market orders, the …rst term
We now turn to the computation of var [W k ]. This variance can be rewritten as
The variance is then
The …rst term var (A) is equal to
Simplifying and noting that
we get
Finally we obtain
as all covariances are equal to zero but
The Using the fact that a n = " b n , the expected pro…t can be rewritten as Given the fact that n a n = j a j 8j 6 = n. Let us assume that n a n = , the desired result is obtained.
Proof of Proposition 2:
Due to the complexity of the case, the market makers'maximization program is solved using numerical procedures. In order to perform it, we use the form given in Lemma 3 for the market maker's expected utility of pro…t where we replace a n by the solution obtained when solving the third degree equation of proposition 1. As a consequence, market maker n's expected utility of pro…t is a function of all the liquidities set by the n 1 other competitors. We use numerical procedures to …nd market maker n best reply to the conjectured level of liquidity set by her competitors. As all market makers are identical, we look for a symmetric equilibrium where we assume that all her competitors set an identical level of liquidity 1 . Given that, we …nd a …xed point, i.e. a level of liquidity equal to the level of her competitors that maximizes her level of expected utility of pro…t. The solution is then called (N ). However, for the solution to exist the following condition is required
. That condition is easily checked for the case where we have risk neutral market makers or when only one trader is present. This condition arises for the more complex case. Once we have found the level of liquidities, we retrieve the values of a (N ) and b (N ).
Proof of Proposition 3:
The proof is done by numerical applications. We reproduce the process by which we …nd the expression of the liquidity parameter from proposition 2 for the di¤erent values of N , m and K.
Proof of Proposition 4:
The proof is done by numerical applications. Once the liquidity value is found from proposition 3 , we then compute the value of both a (N ) and b (N ). Once all the values are computed, we plug them into the expression the market maker's expected utility of pro…t given by (10). The aggregate expected utility of pro…t is then computed as the sum of all individual market maker's expected utility of pro…t. We reproduce the above process for the di¤erent values of N , m and K.
